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Abstract. The standard model of dynamic oligopolistic competition
views ﬁrms as players in a repeated game, where the demand function is the
same in every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if
consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period
then leaves some residual demand to future periods, and pricing in one period
may aﬀect consumers’ expectations of future prices. In particular, consumers
who observe a deviation from collusive ﬁrm behavior may anticipate an ensuing
punishment phase with lower prices, and may therefore postpone purchases. In
a model that incorporates these two additional elements the interaction between
the ﬁrms no longer constitutes a repeated game. We here develop a simple
model of intertemporal demand in a market setting with overlapping cohorts
of consumers, and analyze collusive pricing under Bertrand competition. The
more patient and forward-looking consumers are and the higher is the rate of
consumer turn-over, the easier it is for ﬁrms to collude against them.
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1. Introduction
The Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972) stipulates that a monopolist selling a new durable
good cannot credibly commit to the monopoly price, because once consumers have
made their purchases at this price, the monopolist will have an incentive to reduce the
price in order to capture residual demand from consumers who value the good below
the monopoly price. This in turn, Coase claims, would be foreseen by consumers
with valuations above the monopoly price, and therefore some of these — depending
on their time preference — will postpone their purchase in anticipation of a price fall.
Coase’s argument is relevant not only for a monopoly ﬁrm in a transient market for
a new durable good, but also for oligopolistic ﬁrms in a perpetually ongoing market
for durable and non-durable goods. If such ﬁrms maintain a collusive price above
the competitive price under the threat of a price war, as the literature on repeated-
g a m e ss u g g e s t st h e ym a y ,t h e nc o n s u m e r smight foresee price wars in the wake of
a defection, and hence not buy from a ﬁrm that slightly undercuts the others, but
instead postpone purchase to the anticipated subsequent price war. Such dynamic
aspects of the demand side runs against the spirit of the usual model of dynamic
competition viewed as a repeated-game.1 Indeed, the interaction is no longer a
repeated-game, since the market demand faced by the ﬁrms today in general depends
on history, both through consumers’ expectation formation and through their residual
demand from earlier periods. Consequently, a model with consumers who can make
intertemporal substitution between periods falls outside the domain of the standard
model of dynamic oligopolistic competition.
In this paper we develop just such a model, one that adds intertemporal economic
agents on the demand side to standard Bertrand competition on the ﬁrms’ side. We
show that, in comparison with the case of a monopoly for a new durable product, the
application of Coase’s argument to oligopoly leads to a radically diﬀerent conclusion:
under a wide range of circumstances such intertemporal substitution and foresight
on behalf of the consumers facilitates, rather than undermines, monopoly pricing in
a recurrent market setting. Our conclusion is, however, in line with the ﬁndings
in Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987).2 Indeed, there is a literature
on the Coase conjecture, building on models of consumers who have the possibility
of intertemporal substitution and are endowed with foresight, see for example Gul,
Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and the just mentioned papers. We here model
consumers very much in the same vein. However, while in those models all con-
sumers enter the market in the initial time period, in our model new consumers enter
1See e.g. Tirole (1988) for repeated-games models of dynamic oligopoly, and Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) for various versions of the folk theorem.
2However, we also show that in some circumstances the eﬀect may go in the same direction as in
the Coase conjecture: Collusion may be more diﬃcult if consumers have foresight.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 3
the market in each market period. In this respect we follow Conlisk, Gerstner, and
Sobel (1984) and Sobel (1984, 1991). Like here, these authors assume that con-
sumers diﬀer in their valuation of the good and want to buy the good at most once.
However, while in those models consumers who have not made a purchase remain
forever in the market, and hence residual demand builds up indeﬁnitely over time,
our consumers spend a ﬁnite (random) time in the market — a ﬁxed fraction of the
consumer population leaves the market each period even if they have not made any
purchase. Hence, unlike these earlier models, our model allows for the possibility
of stationary supply and demand conditions. Moreover, ﬁrms in Conlisk, Gerstner,
and Sobel (1984) and Sobel (1984, 1991) cannot resist dropping a collusive price,
that is, have sales, because the residual demand from consumers with low valuations
grows beyond any upper bound. By contrast, ﬁrms in our model can sustain the
same collusive price in equilibrium. Indeed, most of our analysis is focused on such
equilibria. However, we also show that under certain circumstances equilibrium sales
are possible also in our model, that is, with a constant consumer population.
More precisely, the market is open over an inﬁnite sequence of market periods.
In each period every ﬁrm commits to a price in that period. There is a continuum
of consumers, and we model this population as consisting of overlapping cohorts,
where a new cohort of consumers “are born” (enter) in each period and an equally
large set of “old” consumers — that is, who were present in the preceding period
— “die” (leave). The birth and death of consumers are assumed to be driven by
exogenous factors. The size of the consumer population is thus constant. The
population share of newborn consumers in any period is some ﬁxed fraction. This
is also the population share of the previous period’s consumer population who died.
All consumers have the same probability of dying each period. The life time of
every consumer is thus a geometrically distributed random variable with constant
hazard rate and ﬁnite expectation. The demographic composition of the consumer
population is, by contrast, deterministic and stationary. Our model contains the
standard repeated-game model as the special case when the whole population is
turned over every period.
The good in question is sold in indivisible units, and each consumer wants to
buy one unit of the good at most once during his or her lifetime. While having
identical life-table distributions, consumers diﬀer as to their valuation of the good.
In each period, the newly arrived consumers’ valuations are distributed according to
some ﬁxed cumulative distribution function, while the remaining old consumers are
divided into two groups: those who already bought a unit, and those who did not
yet do so. The valuation distribution in the latter group depends on the history of
prices and price expectations.
Following the above-mentioned analyses, we treat ﬁrms as players in the game-DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 4
theoretic sense but model consumers as price-taking and expectation-forming eco-
nomic agents with no strategic power. Their aggregate demand constitutes a state
variable in a stochastic game played by the ﬁrms. The bulk of our analysis is fo-
cused on the case of consumers with perfect foresight. However, this paper is not
a plea that analysts should always assume alle c o n o m i ca g e n t st oh a v ep e r f e c tf o r e -
sight. We believe that consumers and ﬁrms may more realistically be modelled as
having less than perfect foresight, and we indeed show how our model applies to con-
sumers with behaviorally more plausible expectations. Our position is rather that
the contrast in repeated-games models of dynamic oligopolistic competition between,
on the one hand, the intertemporal substitution possibilities, sophistication and ex-
pectations coordination ascribed to ﬁrms, and, on the other hand, the complete lack
of intertemporal substitution ascribed to consumers, should be replaced by a milder
c o n t r a s t . E v e nt a k i n gas m a l ls t e pi nt h i sd i r ection requires the analyst to go outside
the familiar class of repeated-games to the wider and less familiar class of stochastic
games. We here outline how such a generalization can be made, and provide some
of its most direct implications. We also believe that our model of demand can be a
useful work-horse for other dynamic market analyses.
The paper delivers one key trade-oﬀ and a few main results, all of which are
absent in the standard inﬁnitely repeated Bertrand model. The trade-oﬀ has to
do with forward-looking consumers’ reaction to a (deviant) ﬁrm’s price-cut. When
consumers are forward-looking, a price-cut does not necessarily induce consumers
to buy since they might choose to wait for an even lower price in the future; this
reduces the attractiveness to ﬁrms of deviating from a collusive price. On the other
hand, since consumers are long-lived, there are consumers from previous periods
who had chosen not to buy at the going high price. Consequently, a price-cut can
reel in such consumers; this increases the attractiveness of deviating. The relative
size of these two countervailing forces determines whether the payoﬀ to deviation is
smaller or larger than in the standard repeated-games model. When consumers are
suﬃciently patient, the stronger force turns out to be the collusive one. Consumers
defer purchases after the ﬁrst price-cut and wait for the price war to ensue, thus
lowering the deviation payoﬀ to undercutting below that in the repeated-games model.
By contrast, when consumers are impatient, the fact that there is residual demand
from old customers, who add their demand to that of the new high-value ones, implies
that deviation payoﬀs are higher – and collusion is thus harder to sustain – than
in the standard repeated-game model.
There is one other interesting consequence of having long-lived consumers. In
the standard model, if a ﬁrm were to undercut a collusive price, then it would do
so by undercutting ever so marginally. The reason for that is that any price below
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revenue is increasing in prices below the going price (assuming that the collusive price
does not exceed the monopoly price and that the industry revenue function is single-
peaked). In the current model, by contrast, the most proﬁtable under-cutting price
may be substantially lower than the collusive price. Such signiﬁcant under-cutting
can be proﬁtable because it attracts old consumers with low valuations. Only a
signiﬁcant price cut can bring in old consumers, since those amongst them who have
not yet bought have valuations below the going price.3 Since they represent a positive
fraction of the potential buyers, a deviant ﬁrm, when the collusive price is at or near
the monopoly price, will ﬁnd it optimal to capture their demand.
Moreover, since the market price in the ﬁrst period after a unilateral price cut,
if anticipated by consumers, will aﬀect their demand in the defection period, the
“punishment” of a unilateral price cut not only aﬀects the defector’s future proﬁts
but also its proﬁt in the defection period itself. Because of this eﬀect, absent in
repeated games, even harsher punishments than grim trigger strategies are possible
if the marginal cost is positive, namely, to force the defector to price below marginal
cost in the post-deviation period, thus bringing down the proﬁt in the defection
period below what it would have been under grim trigger strategies. We identify
and analyze a class of such “generalized trigger” strategies, and focus on maximally
“harsh” punishments of this sort. Any constant collusive price that can be supported
in subgame perfect equilibrium can also be supported by subgame perfect equilibria
in such strategies, so this approach allows us to explore the full range of stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
The above discussion suggests that it may be proﬁtable for the ﬁrms to now
and then run a coordinated sale, in equilibrium, and thereby increase their proﬁts
above monopoly proﬁts.4 By assumption, such sales are anticipated by consumers
with perfect foresight and will hence reduce proﬁts in the periods just preceding
the sale, but this may be compensated by the proﬁts made during the sale, because
of the accumulated residual demand among old low value consumers. During the
sale, consumers correctly anticipate reversion to “normal” pricing next period, and
hence have no reason to postpone their purchases. This contrasts sharply with the
unanticipated price deviations mentioned above, where the demand facing the under-
cutting ﬁrm is dampened by consumers’ anticipation of an ensuing price war. Such
equilibrium sales can be viewed as a form of temporary price discrimination. We
provide conditions under which equilibrium sales are proﬁtable/unproﬁtable.
3Recall that the only old consumers still in the market are those with valuations below or at the
going price. At a slightly lower price these consumers have virtually no surplus from buying today
but a positive surplus from buying next period (at a low price). So they wait.
4N o t et h a tt h ed i s c u s s i o ni nt h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p hr e f e r r e dt oa no ﬀ-equilibrium path
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There are of course other models of dynamic Bertrand competition that depart
from the repeated-games paradigm. Kirman and Sobel (1974) consider the role of
inventories, and Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Wallner (1999) consider the role of
alternating moves. Selten (1965a,b) and Radner (1999) introduce consumers who
switch suppliers according to observed prices, though not immediately or fully. All
these strands of the literature model a dynamic oligopolistic market as a dynamic or
stochastic game, though diﬀerently from what we do here.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is developed in section 2, and the
ﬁrst steps of the analysis are made in section 3. Our main results concern stationary
subgame perfect equilibria are given in section 4. Section 5 analyses equilibrium
sales, section 6 brieﬂy discusses consumers with adaptive expectations, and section 7
concludes.
2. The model
Suppose there are n ﬁrms in a market for a homogenous indivisible good. The market
operates over an inﬁnite sequence of periods, t =0 ,1,2,....A l l ﬁrms simultaneously
set their prices at the beginning of every period and are committed to that price
during the period. Let pit ≥ 0b eﬁrm i0s price in period t. All consumers observe
all posted prices, and buy from the ﬁrms with the lowest price. The lowest price in
any period will be called the market price in that period,
pt =m i n {p1t,...,pnt}.( 1 )
If more than one ﬁrm asks the market price, then sales are split equally between
these. The ﬁrms face no capacity constraint and produce the good at a constant
marginal cost c ≥ 0. Hence, each ﬁrm’s proﬁt in a market period is simply its sales
multiplied by the diﬀerence between its price and marginal cost. All ﬁrms are risk
neutral and discount future proﬁts by the same discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) between
successive market periods. Resale is not possible.
There is a continuum population of consumers, divided into overlapping cohorts.
A cohort of new consumers arrive (are “born”) each period, and an equally large
set of old consumers, that is, consumers who were in the market in the preceding
period, exit (“die”). The size of the consumer population is thus constant, and we
normalize it to 1. The population share of new consumers in any period is α ∈ (0,1],
and this is also the share of the previous period’s population that exits/dies each
period. All consumers have the same probability α of exiting/dying each period.
We will call α the consumer turn-over rate. It follows that the “life span” S of
every individual is a geometrically distributed random variable, with probability α
for S = 1, probability (1 − α)α for S = 2, probability (1 − α)
2 α for S = 3 etc. The
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stationary: in all periods the share of newly arrived consumers is α,t h es h a r eo f
o n ep e r i o do l d si s( 1− α)α, and, more generally, of s p e r i o d so l d si s( 1− α)sα,f o r
s =0 ,1,2,..... We will call the newly arrived young and all others old.
Each consumer wishes to buy at most one unit of the good during his or her
lifetime. Consumers diﬀer as to their valuation v of the good. In each period, young
consumers’ valuations v are distributed according to a ﬁxed cumulative distribution
function F : R+ → [0,1]. We assume F to be continuous and to be strictly increasing
wherever F (p) < 1. Let D : R+ → [0,1] be deﬁned by D(p)=1− F (p). The
function D corresponds to the demand function in a static setting. Let the function
Π : R+ → R be deﬁned by Π(p)=( p − c)D(p) . W ew i l lr e f e rt ot h i sa st h eindustry
proﬁtf u n c t i o nand assume it to be single-peaked with maximum at some positive
price, the monopoly price, pm =a r gm a x p≥0 Π(p).
All consumers have the same pure time preference, represented by the discount
factor γ ∈ [0,1]: the discounted expected utility from purchase of a unit τ ≥ 0
periods later at price p ≥ 0i s( v − p)γτ, while the utility of never acquiring the good
is normalized to zero.5 In view of the probability α of exiting the market or dying,
the eﬀective discount factor for purchasing decisions, is β =( 1− α)γ.6
2.1. Consumer expectations and choices. Consumers have perfect foresight
concerning future prices. In any given period, let p denote the current market price,
and let pe(τ) be the expected market price τ periods ahead, for τ =0 ,1,2,... (hence
pe(0) = p). For a consumer with valuation v, who has not yet bought a unit, it is
optimal to buy in the present period if and only if her utility from doing so is neither
exceeded by the utility from never buying the good nor by the expected utility from
postponing purchase to some future period, that is, iﬀ








Of particular relevance for the subsequent analysis are scenarios when the price
is expected to remain constant in the near future, then drop to a lower price and
thereafter not fall any lower. Formally: let σ be a positive integer and suppose
pe(τ)=p for τ =0 ,1,2,...σ − 1, pe(σ)=pe <pand pe(τ) ≥ pe for all τ>σ .T h e
special case σ = 1 is thus the scenario when “tomorrow’s” price is expected to be
5An interesting extension is to allow for consumer heterogeneity also with respect to time
preferences.
6This parametrization in eﬀect assumes that consumers literally “die” when exiting the popula-
tion. An alternative scenario, calling for slightly diﬀerent parametrization, is when exiting consumers
migrate to another economy, with other purchasing opportunities – hence, where unspent money
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lower than “today’s,” and σ = 2 the scenario when the price is expected to fall the
“day after tomorrow” etc.
Consider such a price scenario, and a consumer with valuation v who has not yet
bought the good. Her utility from buying in a “pre-sale” period τ<σis βτ (v − p),
from buying in the “sales period” σ is βσ (v − pe), and from buying in a “post-sale”
period τ>σis less than or equal to βσ+1 (v − pe). Hence, it is never optimal to plan
to buy in a post-sale period, nor in a pre-sale period other than the current period
(τ = 0). The remaining choices are: buy in the current period, in the sales period,
o rn o ta ta l l . I ti se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that the ﬁrst choice is optimal if and only if the





1 − βσ .( 3 )
We will call vσ (p,pe)t h ecut-oﬀ valuation level.7 Among the young and those old
who have not yet bought a unit, all consumers with valuations v>v σ (p,pe) will thus
buy in the current period, while those with valuations v<v σ (p,pe)w i l ln o tb u y–
they will either wait for the expected price cut or abstain from buying.8
In any market period, and under any price expectation scenario p,pe (1),p e (2),...,
consider a cohort of consumers who entered s periods ago. From equation (2) it is
clear that it is always the upper tail of the cohort’s value distribution that buys.
Hence, s periods back, when the cohort was “young,” everybody above some cut-oﬀ
valuation purchased the good. In the next period, that is, s − 1p e r i o d sb a c k ,s o m e
more consumers from the same cohort may have purchased the good at a lower price,
and some consumers have “died.” The additional buyers belong to the upper tail
among the non-buyers from s periods back, and so on. By the time this cohort
reaches the current period, it has shrunk in size by the factor 1 − α each period,
and there is a highest valuation vs among the remaining individuals such that all
consumers in the cohort with valuation above vs have already purchased the good,
while none of those with lower valuations have done so.9 In sum: the size of the
cohort that entered s periods ago is α(1 − α)
s, and the valuation distribution in that
cohort is given by the c.d.f. Fs (x)=F (x)/F (vs)f o rx ∈ [0,v s].
7To see that this decision rule is optimal, note that the utility from current purchase is v − p,
from purchase in the sales period βσ (v − pe), and from no purchase it is 0. Thus, if v>v σ (p,pe),
the ﬁrst utility exceeds the second, and, since pe ≤ p, it also exceeds the third (zero). If instead
v<v σ (p,pe), then the second utility exceeds the ﬁrst.
8For the sake of deﬁniteness, but without aﬀecting the results (since the valuation distribution
is assumed continuous), we assume that consumers who are indiﬀerent between buying now and in
the future or not at all, will buy now.
9Note also that vs ≤ vs−1 for all s; an older cohort cannot have a higher current cut-oﬀ valuation
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It follows that the value distribution among the old consumers in any period t who
have not yet made a purchase is completely described by the vector vt =( v1,v 2,..,vt)
of all old cohorts’ highest valuations. This vector determines, in its turn, current
aggregate demand from old consumers, as a function of the current market price and
current consumer expectations about future prices. Current demand from young
consumers, who make up the population share α, is derived from the original value
distribution F.
2.2. Equilibrium. We assume that ﬁrms know all past prices announced in all
earlier periods, as well as the current aggregate demand function.10 This information
deﬁnes the state in the stochastic game played by the n ﬁrms. A (pure behavior)
strategy for a ﬁrm is accordingly a function that speciﬁes a price to set in each
period τ, conditional upon the state in that period. Firms’ strategies constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium if in all periods and states each ﬁrm maximizes its
expected discounted future stream of proﬁts, given all other ﬁrms’ strategies. We
note that, since the stage game in a period in general depends on the current state,
which in general depends on the price history, the strategic interaction between the
ﬁrms is not a repeated but a stochastic game.11
3. Preliminaries
Before analyzing the model in full generality, we here pin-point aggregate demand in
steady state and examine a special case of the present model that coincides with the
usual repeated-games model of dynamic Bertrand competition.
3.1. Aggregate demand. Suppose that in all past periods the market price was
p∗ and that this price was expected to remain in all future periods.12 What would
current aggregate demand then be if consumers (a) experienced a sudden price cut,
p<p ∗, (b) expected some price pe ≤ p in the next period and (c) expected no future
price below pe?
Current demand from new consumers would then simply be their population share,
α, times the share of new consumers with valuations exceeding their current cut-oﬀ
10In fact, it is suﬃcient that ﬁrms hold correct expectations along the induced price path and
after unilateral deviations from this path.
11For a discussion of stochastic - sometimes called Markovian - games, see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), chapter 12, and see Dutta (1995) for equilibrium characterizations in such games.
12More exactly, we here focus on collusion in a market environment where initial conditions have
played out their role. We eﬀectively assume an inﬁnite past, or, equivalently, an initial state that is
consistent with an inﬁnite past.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 10









By contrast, current demand from the old would also depend on their past cut-oﬀ
valuations. When all ﬁrms’ prices in the past were p∗ and were expected to remain
at that level, all old consumers with valuations above p∗ have already bought a unit,
while those with lower valuations have abstained from buying. Hence, we would have
vs = p∗ for all cohorts s ≥ 1. Current demand from the old, whose population share


































This shows that, for suﬃciently low under-cutting prices p, aggregate demand
emanates from both the old and young, while for higher under-cutting prices p it
emanates only from the young – old consumers with high valuations have already
bought a unit. The intermediate under-cutting price that separates these two cases
is a convex combination of current and past expected prices: ¯ p = βpe +( 1− β)p∗.
The more patient consumers are, the more weight is given to the currently expected
p r i c ef o rt h en e x tp e r i o d .
3.2. The repeated-games model. The standard model of dynamic oligopoly
corresponds to the special case when a new batch of consumers enter each period,




for all p∗, p and pe. The oligopoly thus faces the same demand function each period.
We will refer to this special case as the standard repeated-games model.
Trigger strategies supporting a constant collusive price p∗ exceeding marginal
cost can then be deﬁned in the usual way: all ﬁrms ask the price p∗ in the initial
period and continue to do so in all future periods as long as no ﬁrm undercuts this
price. Otherwise, all ﬁrms set the price c, their marginal production cost, from thatDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 11
period on.13 Suppose that consumers observe all past and current prices and have
perfect foresight concerning future prices (at least on the price path induced by the
ﬁrms’ strategy proﬁle and after any unilateral deviation from this path). Given any
current market price p and the price history where all ﬁrms asked the price p∗ in all




p∗, if p = p∗,
c, if p 6= p∗, (8)
for all τ>0. Such expectations fall into the class of price scenarios discussed in
section 2. Hence, cut-oﬀ valuations satisfy equation (3) with σ =1 .
A trigger-strategy proﬁle, in which all ﬁrms quote the same collusive price p∗ in
all periods until a price deviation is detected, from which time on they all quote the





for all p<p ∗,w h e r eΠ is the industry proﬁt function,d e ﬁn e di ns e c t i o n2 . T h e
quantity on the left-hand side of (9) is the present value of the proﬁtt oaﬁrm that
undercuts the collusive price by posting a price p<p ∗ –s u c haﬁrm will earn zero
proﬁt in all future periods – and the quantity on the right-hand side is the present
value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁtw e r ei tt or e m a i na tt h ec o l l u s i v ep r i c ep∗. B yc o n t i n u i t yo f






.( 1 0 )
Since the industry proﬁt function Π by hypothesis is single-peaked, the left-hand side
in equation (10) is simply Π(p∗) if the collusive price p∗ does not exceed the monopoly
price – a deviating ﬁrm then wants to undercut the going price only slightly. Hence,
a collusive price p∗ ∈ (c,pm] is supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in grim
trigger strategies if and only if
δ ≥ 1 − 1/n. (11)
4. Constant-price collusion
Having considered constant collusive pricing in the special case when α =1a n dβ =0 ,
we now turn to situations when 0 <α<1a n d0<β<1. The interaction is no
13In order to make this a complete and subgame perfect strategy speciﬁcation, assume all ﬁrms
set the price c also in case current aggregate demand is inconsistent with p∗ having been the going
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longer a repeated game, and an additional consideration comes into play: the market
price in the ﬁrst period after a deviation from a collusive price, if anticipated by
consumers, will aﬀect their demand in the defection period. Hence, the “punishment”
that follows upon a unilateral price cut not only aﬀects the continuation payoﬀst o
the defector but also the defector’s payoﬀ in the defection period itself. Because of
this eﬀect, absent in repeated games, even harsher punishments than grim trigger
strategies are possible if the marginal cost is positive, namely, to force the defector to
price below marginal cost in the post-deviation period, thus bringing down the proﬁt
in the deviation period below what it would have been under grim trigger strategies.
In subsection 4.1 we identify a class of such “generalized trigger” strategies, with
focus on those with maximally “harsh” punishments, and provide conditions for sub-
game perfect equilibrium in this type of strategy. Since constant collusive prices
that are supported by some subgame perfect strategy proﬁle can be supported by
subgame perfect equilibria in such strategies, we thereby explore the full range of
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes, a point to which we substantiate
in subsection 4.5. Before that, however, we analyze collusion possibilities in gen-
eralized trigger strategies in section 4.2, including limiting results and comparisons
with the repeated-games case α =1a n dβ = 0. Moreover, in section 4.3 we pro-
vide results on the optimal deviation price in the special case of zero marginal cost
and monopoly-price collusion, and illustrate the results in section 4.4 by means of a
parametric example.
4.1. Generalized trigger-strategy equilibria. Suppose, ﬁrst, that c =0 ,a n d
deﬁne “grim trigger” strategies just as in the repeated-games case discussed above.






∗,( 1 2 )
where c = 0. The quantity on the left-hand side is the present value of the proﬁtt o
a ﬁrm that undercuts the collusive price by posting a price p<p ∗ (such a ﬁrm will
earn zero proﬁt in all later periods), and the quantity on the right-hand side is the
present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt were it to remain at the collusive price p∗ –t h e
factor α accounts for the fact that only the young buy in steady state.
Secondly, suppose that c>0. In such cases, harsher punishments than “grim
trigger” strategies are in fact possible. The most severe “punishment” of a defector,
is to drop the market price as much as possible in the ﬁrst punishment period, that is
below marginal cost all the way down to zero, and to keep the expected continuation
proﬁt, as evaluated after a defection, as close as possible to zero. In order to obtain
subgame perfection, such severe punishment should be “incentive compatible:” forDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 13
the defector to “obey” and for the other ﬁr m st oi m p l e m e n t . W eh e r ef o c u so ns u c h
strategies, a class of generalized trigger strategies, where the defector prices at zero
in the ﬁrst punishment period, while all other ﬁrms price at marginal cost in that
period. The defecting ﬁrm thus receives all demand in the defection period, and
hence makes a loss. In the next period, all ﬁrms return to the collusive price p∗
for good with probability q, but with probability 1 − q the punishment price proﬁle
– zero for the defector and marginal cost for the others – is repeated, and so on.
The number of punishment periods is thus random. If the defector does not obey
the punishment pricing in a punishment period, the others restart the punishment
sequence. Other ﬁrms have no incentive to deviate from punishing a deviator since
they earn zero proﬁt in each punishment period and cannot make a positive proﬁt
since at least one other ﬁrm prices at or below marginal cost.14 We assume that the
randomization that determines the duration of punishment is public – a heroic but
common assumption in the repeated games literature.15
More precisely, generalized trigger strategies are deﬁned as follows. Initially, all
ﬁrms ask the same price p∗ >c>0 and they continue to do so as long as no ﬁrm
posts a lower price. Suppose a ﬁrm i in some period t posts a price p<p ∗.I n
the next period, this ﬁrm prices at zero while all other ﬁrms price at marginal cost:
pt+1,i =0<c= pt+1,j for all j 6= i. This is not a Nash equilibrium in the stage
game of that period, however, so incentives have to be created for ﬁrms to play
along. Let ϕ :( 0 ,p ∗) → [0,1], and set q = ϕ(p). With probability q,a l lﬁrms
return to the collusive price p∗ in period t + 2, while with probability 1 − q,t h e y
keep their prices from period t + 1. In the latter case, the same randomization is
independently repeated in period t + 3, etc., resulting in a geometric distribution
of punishment periods (beyond the ﬁrst). The random number T of punishment
p e r i o d st h u ss a t i s ﬁes Pr(T ≥ 1) = 1 and
Pr(T = k +1| T ≥ k)=q
for positive integers k,w h e r eq = ϕ(p). A generalized trigger strategy is thus fully
characterized by the randomization function ϕ.
A generalized trigger strategy proﬁle ϕ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
14In order to make this a complete strategy speciﬁcation, assume all ﬁrms set the price c also in
case current aggregate demand is inconsistent with p∗ having been the going and expected price in
all preceding periods.
15An alternative to randomized duration of punishment is to have deterministic non-decreasing
pricing schemes during a ﬁnite and deterministic number of periods. However, because time is
discrete, such strategy proﬁles lack a certain continuity property that randomized durations have
and that allows for certain analytical results.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 14












































The ﬁrst term in (13) is the defector’s proﬁt in the defection period. Consumers
then see the defector’s current price p and expect the market price zero in the next
period. The second term is the defector’s discounted proﬁt from sales in the ﬁrst
punishment period, where B (p∗,p,0) denotes aggregate demand in this period. The
sum on the second line represents the defector’s discounted proﬁts during punishment
periods 2 and beyond. Only the young buy in these periods, and they make up the
population share α.T h e f a c t o r q(1 − q)
k−1 is the probability that the number T
of punishment periods is k. The associated factor in square brackets is the sum of
discounted proﬁts when T = k; k−1 initial punishment periods of selling to all young
at price zero, followed by all ﬁrms returning to collusive pricing. The expression on
the right-hand side of (13) is the discounted sum of proﬁts that the defecting ﬁrm
would have earned, had it not defected. Likewise, the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side
of (14) represents the proﬁt to the defecting ﬁrm during the ﬁrst punishment period,
and the sum the discounted proﬁts thereafter, evaluated from the ﬁrst punishment
period. The left hand side is thus the present net value to the defecting ﬁrm, after its
defection, of obeying the punishment. Condition (14) requires this present value to
be non-negative; otherwise the defecting ﬁrm would do better by pricing at marginal
cost forever. A generalized trigger strategy proﬁle that meets condition (14) with
equality for all deviation prices p ∈ (c,p∗) will be called tight.
Proposition 1. Suppose that δ ∈ (0,1), n ∈ N, c>0 and p∗ ∈ (c,pm].C o n d i -
tion (12) is necessary for p∗ to be supported by subgame perfect generalized trigger
strategies. This condition is also suﬃcient for tight generalized trigger strategies sup-
porting p∗ to be subgame perfect. Condition (15) below is suﬃcient for the existence
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Proof: Let δ ∈ (0,1), n ∈ N, c>0, p∗ ∈ (c,pm] and consider a generalized
trigger strategy with randomization function ϕ, such that p∗ is the price on the path
of the proﬁle. Then conditions (13) and (14) hold for all p ∈ (c,p∗)w h e nq = ϕ(p).
Insertion of (14) into (13) gives (12), proving the ﬁrst claim. For the second claim,
consider a tight generalized trigger strategy with randomization function ϕ.T h e n
(14) holds with equality for all p ∈ (c,p∗). Inserting this equality into condition (13)
shows that the latter holds for all p<p ∗ if and only if condition (12) holds. For
the third claim, note, for any given deviation price p, the left-hand side of (14) is an
increasing and continuous function f of q ∈ [0,1], with f (0) = −cB (p∗,p,0) and





By the intermediate value theorem, f (0) < 0 <f(1) is suﬃcient for the existence
of a termination probability q ∈ (0,1) such that (14) holds with equality for that
deviation price p.I t r e m a i n s t o e x a m i n e B (p∗,p,0). This is aggregate demand in
the ﬁrst punishment period, emanating from the young in that period, plus the young
in the defection period who did not buy then and survived one period, plus the old
in the defection period who did not buy and who survived one more period:
B (p







































Thus B (p∗,p,0) > 0 and hence f (0) < 0, and this holds for all p.M o r e o v e r ,
F (0) ≥ 0 and hence
B (p
∗,p,0) ≤ α +( 1− α)α +( 1− α)
2 =1 ,
again for all p. Thus, condition (15) is suﬃcient for the existence of a tight generalized
trigger strategy proﬁle supporting p∗. In force of claim two, this establishes claim
three in the proposition. End of proof.
Note that the suﬃcient condition (15) for the existence of tight generalized trigger
strategies is met when c =0 ,a n df o ra l ls u ﬃciently large discount factors δ<1w h e n
c>0. The subsequent analysis is predicatedu p o nc o n d i t i o n( 1 5 ) ,a n di sf o c u s s e d
on tight generalized trigger strategies.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 16
4.2. Collusion possibilities: Limit results and comparison with the repeated-
games model. Using (6) and dividing through by α>0, the subgame perfection



























This condition immediately implies a “Folk Theorem”- like result:
Proposition 2. For each collusive price p∗ ∈ (c,pm] there exists a discount factor
¯ δ(p∗) < 1 such that p∗ is sustainable in subgame perfect equilibrium for all δ ∈ ¡¯ δ(p∗),1
¢
.
In other words: just as in the standard repeated-games approach, collusive prices
are sustainable provided ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. Note, however, that unlike in
that special case, the critical discount factor in general depends on the collusive price
p∗.
We turn to a comparison of the deviation proﬁt in this model with that in the
standard repeated-game model, for any given discount factor δ high enough to meet
condition (15). The left-hand side of (16) is the present value of the stream of
net proﬁts per young consumer to a ﬁrm that undercuts the going collusive price by
setting p<p ∗ (recall that the young make up the population share α). By continuity






,( 1 7 )
where ˆ π(p∗,α,β)i st h emaximal deviation proﬁt (per young consumer):
ˆ π(p
























The right-hand side in the equilibrium condition (17) is identical to that in the
standard repeated-games case (inequality (10)). Moreover, if α =1a n dβ =0 ,a si n
the standard repeated-games case, then ˆ π(p∗,α,β)=Π(p∗). Hence, condition (17)
then coincides with the repeated-games equilibrium condition (11).
It is easily veriﬁed that the generalized deviation proﬁtˆ π(p∗,α,β) is continuous,
non-decreasing in p∗, and non-increasing in each of α and β. Hence, collusion is easier
the higher the consumer turn-over rate α and their eﬀective discount factor β are,
while the eﬀect of a change of a collusive price p∗ <p m is left ambiguous, since bothDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 17
sides of the inequality (17) are non-decreasing in p∗.H o w e v e r , w h e n p∗ = pm,t h e n
the right-hand side is maximal, and thus we may conclude that a marginal reduction
in the collusive price, from monopoly pricing, does not facilitate collusion. More
exactly:
Proposition 3. The deviation proﬁt ˆ π(p∗,α,β) is continuous in all three arguments.
For p∗ ≤ pm, it is non-decreasing in p∗ and non-increasing in each of α and β,w i t h




∗) ⇔ β ≤ ¯ β.
Proof: The continuity claim follows from the continuity of D =1−F,b yB e r g e ’ s
Maximum Theorem. The equation ˆ π(p∗,1,0) = Π(p∗)=m a x p∈[0,p∗] Π(p) follows
from the monotonicity of D.M o r e o v e r , ˆ π(p∗,α,β)i sn o n - d e c r e a s i n gi np∗ since
the interval [0,p ∗], from which the maximand is chosen, is increasing in p∗,a n dt h e
maximand is point-wise non-decreasing in p∗. Likewise, ˆ π(p∗,α,β) is non-increasing
in α since the maximand is point-wise non-increasing in α, and likewise for β,s e e
equation (18). Finally, let p∗ >cand α ∈ (0,1). Then ˆ π(p∗,α,β) is continuous and















where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of D. End of proof.
Recall that β =( 1 − α)γ,w h e r eγ i st h ec o n s u m e r s ’p u r et e m p o r a ld i s c o u n t
factor, and, for now, keep the consumer turn-over rate α ∈ (0,1) ﬁxed. It follows
from the proposition that the deviation proﬁti s( w e a k l y )l o w e rt h em o r epatient the
consumers are – the higher γ is. The intuition for this is clear. Suppose a ﬁrm
undercuts the collusive price. The more patient the consumers are, ceteris paribus,
the more of them will postpone their purchase until next period’s anticipated “price
war.” If consumers are suﬃciently patient,t h a ti s ,i fγ>¯ γ = ¯ β/(1 − α), then the
maximal deviation proﬁt is lower than or equal to that in the repeated-games case:
collusion is then easier to sustain than in the repeated-games model. By contrast,
if consumers are suﬃciently impatient, γ ≤ ¯ γ, then the maximal deviation proﬁt
(weakly) exceeds that in the corresponding repeated-games case: collusion is then
h a r d e rt os u s t a i nt h a ni nt h er e p e a t e d - g a m e sm o d e l . 16 We illustrate this graphically
in an example below.
16Note that we have not excluded the possibility that ¯ γ ≥ 1. The analysis under the constraint
¯ γ ≤ 1 is more cumbersome but does not give much in terms of additional insight.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 18
4.3. Zero marginal cost and monopoly pricing. We here focus on the special
case of zero marginal cost, c = 0, and collusive monopoly pricing. Unlike in the
standard repeated-games case, the optimal deviation is then a sizeable price cut. To
see this, ﬁrst note that
ˆ π(p
m,α,β)=m a x{ˆ π1 (p
m,α,β), ˆ π2 (p
m,α,β)},( 1 9 )
where ˆ π1 is the optimal deviation proﬁto v e rt h ep r i c er a n g e ,p ≤ ¯ p =( 1− β)pm,
i nw h i c hb o t ho l da n dy o u n gb i t e ,a n dˆ π2 is the supremum deviation proﬁto v e rt h e
(open) price range, ¯ p<p<p m, in which only young consumers bite.
Proposition 4. ˆ π1 (pm,α,β) ≥ ˆ π2 (pm,α,β) for all α,β ∈ (0,1).



















r≤pm r[D(r) − (1 − α)D(p










=( 1 − β)max
r≥pm rD(r)=( 1− β)Π(p
m).
End of proof.
In other words, it always pays oﬀ to make a price all the way down to(1 − β)pm or
further, where both old and young bite. Moreover, if D is continuously diﬀerentiable,










In the limit as α → 1a n dβ → 0, we obtain ˆ p → pm, just as in the standard
repeated-games case.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 19
4.4. Example. For the sake of illustration, suppose that consumer valuations are
uniformly distributed on the unit interval: D(p)=m a x {0,1 − p}.T h e n Π(p)=




(1 + α)(1− β). (20)
Hence, the optimal deviation price increases with the consumer turn-over rate α and










a decreasing function both of α and of β.U s i n gβ =( 1− α)γ, this combines to
ˆ p =
(1 + α)[1− (1 − α)γ]
4
,( 2 2 )
and
ˆ π1 =







The diagram below shows isoquants for the optimal deviation price, ˆ p,a saf u n c -
tion of α (horizontal axis) and γ (vertical axis).










Figure 1: Contour map for the optimal undercutting price, as a function of α and γ.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 20
The thick, curve is the isoquant where ˆ p is just below pm,t h a ti s ,w h e r et h e
optimal deviation price is close to the marginal under-cutting that is familiar from
the repeated-games model of price competition. From the left, the curves are the
isoquants for ˆ p =0 .1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4a n d0 .495, respectively (recall that pm =0 .5). The
optimal deviation price is hence far below the going monopoly price when consumers
are patient and their turn-over rate is small, a combination that arises when market
periods are short. In other words, the optimal under-cutting is signiﬁcant when ﬁrms
cannot commit to their prices for long periods – in stark contrast with the usual
repeated-games model of price competition.
The next diagram shows isoquants for the maximal deviation proﬁt, ˆ π1,a sa
function of α (horizontal axis) and γ (vertical axis). The thick, kinked curve is the
isoquant for ˆ π1 = Π(pm), that is, where the maximal deviation proﬁti st h es a m ea s
in the repeated-games model. Parameter pairs (α,γ) above (below) this curve result
in lower (higher) deviation proﬁts. Hence, collusion is easier (harder) in the present
model than in the repeated-games model for parameter pairs above the curve.










Figure 2: Contour map for the maximal deviation proﬁt, as a function of α and γ.
We also note that the two iterated limits of the maximal deviation proﬁtp e r
young consumer, ˆ π1,when α → 0a n dγ → 1, diﬀer:
lim
α→0 lim









α→0 ˆ π1 =+ ∞.
However, the iterated limits of the maximal deviation proﬁt in absolute terms, αˆ π1,
do agree: both equal Π(pm)=1 /4.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 21
To obtain a determined limit of the maximal deviation proﬁtp e ry o u n gc o n s u m e r ,
suppose the length of the market period is taken down from one to zero. With a
market-period of length ∆ ∈ (0,1), we would then have α = ∆·a and γ =e x p( −b · ∆)
for some a,b > 0. Taking this continuous-time limit, we obtain
lim
∆→0
ˆ π1 = lim
∆→0










Hence, in the limit, collusive monopoly pricing is easier (harder) to sustain in the
present model than in the repeated-games model if b<3a (b>3a), that is, if
consumers are relatively patient in comparison with their turn-over rate.
Finally, we note that collusion at the monopoly price constitutes a strict equi-
librium for many parameter combinations, in the sense that the maximal deviation
proﬁt is strictly lower than the equilibrium proﬁt. This is, for example, the case for
all (α,γ)-pairs below the thick curve in Figure 2, granted condition (11) holds.
4.5. Other strategies. So far we have focused on a certain class of strategies
– tight generalized trigger strategies. The reader might wonder to what extent
our results are predicated on this restriction. We believe they are not and in this
section we will discuss why. In particular, we claim that any collusive price that
can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium can also be sustained in subgame
perfect equilibrium when ﬁrms use tight generalized trigger strategies – a conclusion
that is a generalization of that for “grim” trigger strategies in the standard repeated-
game model. The reasoning in the current model has one twist that is absent
in the repeated game. The conclusion holds in the repeated-game case because
future proﬁts – after a deviation – are as low as possible (zero) in the subsequent
continuation subgame when grim trigger strategies are used. The same holds true in
the present model when c =0 ,a n dt h e na l s ocurrent deviation proﬁts are as low as
possible, because consumers have the greatest incentive to postpone purchases if they
anticipate the lowest possible price (zero) the next period. For c>0, however, the
latter no longer holds true for grim trigger strategies: current period deviation proﬁts
are instead lowest under tight generalized trigger strategies, because consumers then
anticipate the price zero, instead of c>0i nt h en e x tp e r i o d .
To see this, consider any subgame perfect strategy proﬁle supporting a constant
collusive price p∗. The implied punishment is then necessarily milder than under tight
generalized trigger strategies. A consumer with perfect foresight anticipates the path
of prices pe(τ), τ =1 ,2,.... under the punishment strategy proﬁle in question, where
the (current) deviation period has been labelled τ = 0. The consumer thus buys
in the current period if and only if condition (2) holds. It immediately follows that
the quantity on the right-hand side is not larger than under tight generalized triggerDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 22
punishment – since then pe(1) = 0. Hence, the incentives of consumers to wait
until the next period is the highest under tight generalized trigger strategies. The
current period deviation proﬁti st h u s( w e a k l y )l a r g e rf o rad e v i a t i n gﬁrm under any
other strategy proﬁle. This is a new phenomenon that does not exist in the standard
repeated-game model: intertemporal consumers are more likely to buy in the current
period if they anticipate a milder price war. The second eﬀect — which does exist in
the standard model — is that a milder punishment also implies that future proﬁts are
higher, as compared with those under tight generalized trigger strategies. Therefore,
the two eﬀects work in the same direction and together imply that (total) deviation
proﬁts are higher under any alternative strategy proﬁle. In sum:
Proposition 5. Any collusive price that can be sustained in subgame perfect equilib-
rium can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium under tight generalized trigger
strategies.
5. Equilibrium sales
We have so far only considered constant collusive prices. However, a temporary
price cut, in equilibrium, could be a way for the industry to capture residual demand
and thereby increase ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts above the monopoly proﬁt for the industry.
Temporary equilibrium price cuts are qualitatively diﬀerent than out-of equilibrium
price cuts, since in the ﬁrst case, consumers do not expect an ensuing price war and
hence do “bite” during the sale. A model of sales has been developed in Sobel
(1984, 1991). However, while no consumer “dies” in Sobel’s models, and therefore
residual demand under a constant market price builds up without bounds over time,
our consumers do “die,” and residual demand thus is bounded. Nevertheless, residual
demand may be suﬃciently large to motivate temporary sales in equilibrium. We
here identify conditions under which “sales equilibria” with proﬁts above monopoly
proﬁts do and do not exist. Roughly speaking, existence hinges upon whether or not
ﬁrms are more patient than consumers – an observation qualitatively in line with
Sobel’s ﬁndings. Similar results to the ones presented here have been obtained by
Argenton (2004) for the case of two-point valuation distributions.
In order to highlight the potential proﬁtability of equilibrium sales, let us ﬁrst
brieﬂy consider an extreme case. Suppose that consumers are maximally impatient,
γ =0 ,a n dt h a ta l lﬁrms ask the monopoly price, pm, in all “normal” periods, and
some lower price ps in a unique sales period, t = S.T h e n e a c h ﬁrm earns its share
of the industry monopoly revenue, αΠ(pm)/n, in all normal periods, just as under
constant collusion at the monopoly price. For although new consumers anticipate
the upcoming sale, their impatience drives them to buy in their ﬁr s tp e r i o di nt h e
market. In the sales period, however, also all old consumers with valuations betweenDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 23
ps and pm buy. Choosing the sales price ps optimally, all ﬁrms earn more in that



















Generically, this inequality holds strictly, and, by continuity, it then also holds for all
γ>0s u ﬃciently close to zero. Moreover, the deviation incentive, both in “normal”
and “sales” periods, can be analyzed along the lines developed above for steady-state
collusion.
More generally and precisely, consider recurrent sales, where all ﬁrms set the
same sales price ps every S periods, where S>1 is an integer, and ask the same price
po ≥ ps in all other, “ordinary,” periods. In all non-sales periods, only new consumers
buy, and only those with valuations above vσ (po,p s), where σ is the number of periods
remaining before the next sale, see equation (3). All other young consumers in the
cohort will postpone purchase until the next sale, or not buy at all. Hence, if the
sale occurs in periods 0, S,2 S,3 S..., then industry proﬁts (per new consumer) in

















































Consequently, aggregate demand and industry proﬁts decline over time t as the sale
in period S comes closer. The present value of the expected stream of future proﬁts
thus varies over each sales cycle.
We report two results, one positive and one negative, for the proﬁtability and sus-
tainability of sales equilibria of this form. For the positive result, suppose parameters
are such that pm is sustainable as a strict steady-state subgame perfect equilibrium
(an example was given in section 4). Does there then exists a subgame perfect strat-
egy proﬁle, with recurrent sales as deﬁned above, which results in a higher discountedDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 24
payoﬀ to all ﬁrms? In order to answer this question, we consider the discounted sum











For an aﬃrmative answer to the posed question, it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a tt h e r e
exists a price pair (ps,p m)s u c ht h a t( a )Ψ(ps,p m) > Ψ(pm,p m) and (b) there exists
a subgame-perfect strategy proﬁle that induces the sales price-pair (ps,p m).
Proposition 6. Suppose that the valuation distribution F is diﬀerentiable with pos-
itive density at the monopoly price, pm, and that the monopoly price is sustainable
as a strict steady-state subgame perfect equilibrium. If δ>γ , then there exists a
continuum of subgame perfect sales price-pairs (ps,p m) that yield higher discounted
payoﬀst oa l lﬁrms than collusion at the monopoly price.
Proof:W e ﬁrst establish that Ψ(ps,p m) > Ψ(pm,p m)f o ra l lps <p m suﬃciently
close to pm by way of taking the derivative of Ψ(ps,p m) with respect to its ﬁrst
argument, at ps = pm:
Ψ1 (p
s,p





























w h e r ew eu s e dt h eﬁrst-order condition Π0 (pm)=0 . B yh y p o t h e s i s ,F0 (pm) > 0
and pm >c . Hence, Ψ1 < 0, if δt−S < (1 − α)
S−t βt−S.U s i n g β =( 1 − α)γ,
the last inequality is equivalent with δ>γ .T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s o u r ﬁrst claim. The
second claim follows by continuity: since by hypothesis pm is a strict equilibrium
price, generalized trigger strategies will also support, in subgame perfect equilibrium,
sales prices ps <p m suﬃciently close to pm. End of proof.
In other words, if ﬁrms are more patient than consumers, then there exist sales
equilibria that result in proﬁts above monopoly proﬁts. What if consumers are more
17The following results do not depend on this choice: they can be shown to be independent of
which period in the cycle is taken as the point of evaluation.DYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 25
patient than the ﬁrms? At least in the special case of linear demand, it is not diﬃcult
to show that sales equilibria are unproﬁtable:
Proposition 7. Suppose that the valuation distribution F is uniform and c<p ∗ ≤
pm.I fδ ≤ γ,t h e nΨ(ps,p ∗) < Ψ(p∗,p ∗) for all ps <p ∗.
Proof:L e t p∗ ∈ (c,pm] be given, and take the derivative of Ψ(ps,p ∗) with respect


















where λ>0 is the constant density of F.W e h a v e Π0 (ps) > 0f o ra l lps <p m,a n d
each term in the sum is non-negative if δt−S ≥ (1 − α)
S−t βt−S, or, equivalently, if
δ ≤ γ. End of proof.
6. Consumers with adaptive expectations
Some generalizations to consumers with imperfect foresight seem analytically feasible
in our modelling framework. For example, if all consumers have adaptive expec-
tations in the sense that they always expect the current price to prevail also in the
future, then a deviating ﬁrm will sell to all new and old consumers with valuations
above the under-cutting price, and hence earn a higher proﬁt than when consumers
have perfect foresight. Consequently, it is harder to collude against consumers with
adaptive expectations.
To see the implications of adaptive expectations more precisely, note that such
consumers’ behavior is identical with that of consumers with perfect foresight but
with maximal impatience. The deﬁnition of aggregate demand in equation (6) is
valid for any expectations, not just perfect foresight, and all of the above analysis
applies to adaptive expectations, by way of either setting consumers’ price expecta-
tion equal to the current price, pe = p, or, equivalently, by assuming perfect foresight
but setting the eﬀective discount factor β equal to zero. It follows immediately from
Proposition 3 that collusion against consumers with adaptive expectations (β =0 )i s
easier than collusion against consumers with rational expectations (β>0). It also
follows that collusion against consumers with adaptive expectations and intertem-
poral substitution possibilities (β =0a n dα<1) is easier than collusion in the
repeated-games model (β =0a n dα = 1), see Proposition 3 and the example in
section 4.4.
The current model also allows for intermediate cases, when either a population
fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of the consumers have perfect foresight and the rest adaptiveDYNAMIC BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH INTERTEMPORAL DEMAND 26
expectations, or where all consumers form expectations that are a convex combination
of adaptation and perfect foresight. For instance, if p<p ∗ is the current price and
ﬁrms use generalized trigger strategies, then adaptive expectations give pe = p, perfect
foresight pe = 0, and intermediate expectations pe = µp for some µ ∈ (0,1).
7. Concluding comments
Our model of Bertrand competition in recurrent market interaction is built on a
number of simplifying assumptions. One such assumption is that consumers are ho-
mogeneous with respect to their time preferences: all consumers are assumed to have
t h es a m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ. A less restrictive assumption would be to assume that
β, like the valuation v of the good, is drawn from some ﬁxed probability distribution.
Another simpliﬁcation is that we have focused on the case of an indivisible good.
It seems likely that the qualitative results carry over also to the case of divisible
goods. A third simpliﬁcation is the assumption of no resale. For many durable
goods, there are second-hand markets, and these markets interact in an important
way with the markets for new units. These are tasks for future research.
Also, we have focused exclusively on the idealized case of perfect foresight on be-
half of the consumers. Some generalizations to consumers with imperfect foresight
seem analytically feasible in our modelling framework, see comments in the preced-
ing section. A study of collusion against boundedly rational consumers would be a
valuable extension.
We ﬁnally mention yet two other avenues for future research, namely to apply
the present model of intertemporal demand to Cournot oligopoly and to oligopolistic
competition when ﬁrm’s products are imperfect substitutes.
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